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Introduction
An indictment is an accusatory instrument, returned by a grand jury, formally
charging a defendant with a crime. An information is also an accusatory instrument
which formally charges a defendant with crime, but it is brought by a prosecutor
without the intervention of a grand jury. At common law a criminal defendant had a
right to indictment on the charge before he could be tried for a felony. At common
law there was no right to indictment for misdemeanors, which could be prosecuted
without an indictment on the basis of an information. In Georgia, an information is
known as an accusation.
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The grand jury indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment in the Federal Bill of Rights
does not apply to state criminal prosecutions, and there is no federal statutory
provision guaranteeing a right to indictment to state criminal defendants. Therefore,
whether there is a right to indictment by a grand jury in Georgia is a question of
Georgia, not federal, law. None of Georgia’s ten constitutions has contained a
guarantee of the right to indictment; in this state, traditionally the right to indictment
has been entirely based on the common law, as modified by statute. Thus, at present
the right to grand jury indictment in Georgia is a common law right that subsists to the
extent it has not been restricted by statutory law.
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The Decline of the Right to Indictment in Georgia
Prior to 1915 a Georgia criminal defendant’s common law right to grand jury
indictment applied in two circumstances: first, where the defendant was charged with
a felony; and second, where a defendant was charged with a misdemeanor in a
superior court. This right to indictment was nonwaivable. However, a person
charged with a misdemeanor in a city court of a county or city or in some other local
court vested with misdemeanor jurisdiction, could, if the statute establishing the court
so provided, be tried on the basis of an accusation. Thus, prior to 1915 in Georgia
any person prosecuted for either a felony or a misdemeanor in a superior court had a
nonwaivable right to be prosecuted on the basis of an indictment; and a person
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prosecuted for a misdemeanor in a court other than a superior court had a right to
indictment unless a statutory provision authorized the prosecution to be based on an
accusation.
In 1915 the General Assembly enacted the first statute in this state’s history limiting
the use of grand jury indictments in the superior courts. The statute provided that in
all misdemeanor cases in a superior court the prosecutor could prefer an accusation
and that the defendant could be tried on the basis of the accusation, but only where the
defendant waived his right to indictment. It was two decades before the legislature
enacted another statute limiting use of indictments in superior court. Therefore,
between 1915 and 1935 the right to indictment in Georgia was the same as it had been
prior to 1915, except that waiver of indictment in misdemeanor cases in the superior
courts was now permissible.
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In 1935 a statute was enacted that extended the waiver provisions of the 1915 statute
to noncapital felonies. Under the 1935 act, in all noncapital felony cases, as well as
all misdemeanor cases, in the superior courts the prosecutor could prefer an
accusation and the defendant could be tried on the basis of the accusation, if the
defendant waived his right to grand jury indictment. The 1935 statute marked a
drastic departure from the previous rule that in all felony prosecutions in the superior
courts a grand jury indictment was required. Prior to the 1935 statute, “a court had no
jurisdiction to try, or accept a plea of guilty of one charged with a felony until the
grand jury had returned an indictment.”
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After enactment of the 1935 act, therefore, the right to grand jury indictment in
Georgia embraced the following: (1) there was a nonwaivable right to indictment in
capital felony cases; (2) in a superior court in a misdemeanor or a noncapital felony
case there was a waivable right to indictment; and (3) there was a right to indictment
in a misdemeanor case prosecuted in a court other than a superior court, unless a
statute authorized prosecutions in the particular court to be based on an accusation.
This remained the state of law regarding the right to grand jury indictment in Georgia
for the next 37 years. Then, in 1972, the General Assembly abolished the right to
indictment for misdemeanors prosecuted in the superior courts. The 1972 statute
expressly stated that in a superior court “indictment by a grand jury ... [is] not required
in misdemeanor cases.” The death blow to the right to indictment in misdemeanors in
this state was delivered nine years later, in 1983, when OCGA § 15-7-46 was enacted,
abolishing the right to indictment in the state courts of the various counties, where
almost all misdemeanor cases have been prosecuted in Georgia for many
years. OCGA § 15-7-46 provides: “The accused in criminal proceedings in a state
court shall not have the right to indictment by the grand jury of the county.”
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From passage of the 1935 statute until 1983, therefore, there was no change in the law
regarding the right to indictment in felony cases, whereas the right to indictment in
misdemeanor cases was abrogated in part in 1972 and then abrogated completely in
1983. There were no further statutory modifications of the right to grand jury
indictment in Georgia until 1992 when, for the first time in this state’s history, the
General Assembly abolished the right to grand jury indictment with respect to certain
enumerated felonies. Under the 1992 legislation, these specified felonies could be
prosecuted without indictment and without a waiver of indictment by the defendant.
The 1992 statute enacted OCGA § 17-7-70.1 into law. Under § 17-7-70.1(a), in
felony cases where a defendant had expressly waived a commitment hearing or had
been bound over at a commitment hearing, a district attorney was authorized to
proceed against the defendant on the basis of an accusation, and without indictment,
with respect to violations of (1) OCGA § 16-8-2 (theft by taking), (2) § 16-8-3 (theft
by shoplifting), (3) § 16-8-18 (entering automobile), (4) § 16-9-1 (first degree
forgery), (5) § 16-9-2 (second degree forgery), (6) § 16-9-20 (deposit account fraud),
(7) § 16-9-31 (credit card theft), (8) § 16-9-33 (credit card fraud), (9) § 16-9-33
(unauthorized use of credit card), (10) § 16-10-52 (escape), and (11) § 40-5-58
(habitual violator). Under OCGA § 17-7-70.1(d), however, a district attorney could
not file an accusation in a case where a grand jury had heard evidence or conducted an
investigation or where a no true bill had been returned.
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A 1996 statute amended § 17-7-70.1 to add OCGA § 16-13-30 (purchase, possession,
manufacturing, distribution or sale of controlled substances or marijuana) to the list of
felonies which could be prosecuted on the basis of an accusation and without an
indictment.
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A 1998 statute entirely rewrote OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a), but left the rest of § 17-7-70.1
intact. The 1998 revision made two major changes in § 17-7-70.1(a).
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First, the number of felonies which now can be prosecuted based on an accusation,
and without an indictment, has been increased by 131. Whereas prior to 1998 only 12
felonies could be prosecuted without indictment, the 1998 act catapults that number to
a whopping 143. OCGA § 17-7-70.1 now permits the following felonies to be
prosecuted on the basis of an accusation without the necessity of an indictment: (1)
the 12 felonies previously enumerated in the 1992 and 1996 statutes; (2) the felony
theft offenses in article I of chapter 8 of Title 16 of the OCGA, comprising 18 more
felonies; (3) the felony forgery and fraudulent practices offenses in chapter 9 of Title
16 of the OCGA, comprising 106 more felonies; (4) the felony escape and other
offenses in article 3 of chapter 10 of Title 16 of the OCGA, comprising 6 more
felonies; and (5) the felony offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of OCGA § 16-11-131.
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Second, whereas under the 1992 statute a prosecutor could not proceed by accusation
instead of indictment unless the defendant had either been bound over at a
commitment hearing or had expressly waived a commitment hearing, under the 1998
act an accusation now may form the basis of a prosecution for any of the numerous
felonies enumerated in OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) if the defendant was bound over at a
commitment hearing or if the defendant expressly or by operation of law waived a
commitment hearing. Authorizing use of accusations where the commitment hearing
has been waived by operation of law significantly increases the likelihood that the
prosecutor will be able to dispense with grand jury indictments with respect to
prosecutions for the 142 felonies enumerated in § 17-7-70.1(a).
Insofar as it authorizes district attorneys to prosecute certain noncapital felonies on
the basis of an accusation, without indictment and without waiver of indictment,
OCGA § 17-7-70.1 is undoubtedly constitutional.
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Conclusion
At present the scope of the common law right to grand jury indictment in Georgia is
as follows. First, there is an absolute, nonwaivable right to indictment in capital
cases. Second, there is a waivable right to indictment with respect to noncapital
felonies. Third, there is no longer any right to indictment with respect to either
misdemeanors or the noncapital felonies enumerated in OCGA § 17-7-70.1, as
amended in 1998.
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Since the early years of the 20th century, therefore, there has been a marked decline of
the right to grand jury indictment in Georgia, except in capital felony cases. In
noncapital felony cases the right to indictment has been transformed from a
nonwaivable right into a waivable one, and there are now a number of noncapital
felonies for which there is no longer any right to indictment whatever. The right to
indictment for misdemeanors, once a nonwaivable right (at least in the superior
courts), was transformed into a waivable right and then partially and later entirely
abolished (except that under a 1997 statute police officers charged with a
misdemeanor in either a superior or a state court have a right to grand jury indictment
if the crime is alleged to have occurred while in the performance of the officers’s
official duties).
Despite this waning of the common law right to grand jury indictment in Georgia,
there are still situations where a violation of the right to indictment will invalidate a
conviction. Thus, a Georgia conviction is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
if (1) the defendant was prosecuted for a capital felony on the basis of an accusation,
regardless of whether he waived indictment, or (2) the defendant was prosecuted on
the basis of an accusation for a noncapital felony not one of the felonies enumerated
in
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OCGA § 17-7-70.1, and there was no valid waiver of indictment. Although there are
not yet any reported cases on point, it also appears that, in the absence of a valid
waiver of indictment, a conviction arising out of a prosecution based of an accusation
charging one of the felonies enumerated in § 17-7-70.1 would be invalid if the district
attorney had violated the procedural requirements of § 17-7-70.1, as in a case where
the defendant had not been bound over at a commitment hearing and had not waived
the commitment hearing, or where the grand jury had heard evidence or conducted an
investigation or returned a no true bill.
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